Montana Law Review
Volume 80
Issue 1 Winter 2019

Article 4

5-15-2019

From Foundational Law to Limiting Principles in Federal Indian
Law
Alexander T. Skibine
Panelist, S.J. Quinney Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law,
alexander.skibine@law.utah.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Alex Tallchief Skibine, From Foundational Law to Limiting Principles in Federal Indian Law, 80 Mont. L.
Rev. 67 (2019).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Skibine: Limiting Principles in Federal Indian Law
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-1\MON103.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

15-MAY-19

9:36

FROM FOUNDATIONAL LAW TO LIMITING PRINCIPLES
IN FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
Alex Tallchief Skibine*

I. INTRODUCTION
In a noted article, the late Philip Frickey described how federal Indian
law, since its inception, has been “exceptional” in the sense of being distinctive compared to other areas of American Public Law.1 The foundational principle animating this exceptionalism is Chief Justice Marshall’s
description of Indian nations as “domestic dependent nations” that, although existing within the territorial boundaries of the United States, have
retained many aspects of their original sovereignty.2 Professor Frickey,
however, also described how more recently federal Indian law’s exceptionalism was being dismantled by what he called a “flattening [of] federal
Indian law into the broader American public law by importing general constitutional and subconstitutional [sic] values into the field.”3 In my view,
one of the main reasons for the United States Supreme Court’s failure to
stand by the exceptionalism of the past is that the political, economic, and
social position of tribes within the United States has dramatically changed
since these exceptional principles were initially developed. From conquered
* S.J. Quinney Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. Thanks to the
Editors of the Montana Law Review for organizing a great symposium. This research was made possible, in part, through a generous grant from the Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty excellence.
1. See Philip P. Frickey, Native American Exceptionalism in American Public Law, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 431 (2005).
2. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 13 (1831). From this principle, the Court has
derived three other principal doctrines: (1) the congressional plenary power doctrine giving Congress
exclusive and plenary authority over Indian Affairs; (2) the Indian trust doctrine under which the United
States has a duty of protection towards the tribes; and (3) the Indian preemption doctrine that presumes
that states do not have jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country. From the Indian sovereignty doctrine,
the Court derived one important sub-doctrine, the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine. See Kiowa Tribe
of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998). From the congressional plenary
power doctrine, the Court derived the Mancari sub-doctrine, allowing Congress to single out Indians for
special treatment without such classification being considered a racial classification. See Morton v.
Mancari, 471 U.S. 535, 554 (1974). Finally, from the trust doctrine, the Court derived the Indian canons
of statutory and treaty interpretations. See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899) (finding that
Indian canons of statutory and treaty interpretation are necessary as a result of the tribes’ unequal bargaining position and the presence of a language barrier during treaty negotiations).
3. See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of
Indian Tribal Authority over Non-Members, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 7, 58, 59, 65, 79 (1999). According to
Professor Frickey, this “flattening” has been accomplished by the Court in essentially four ways: (1)
abandoning the Indian law canons of statutory construction; (2) using federal common law under the
guise of statutory interpretation; (3) using constitutional values as a premise for its common law even
though the Constitution is not, strictly speaking, applied to Indian tribes; and (4) importing principles
from the general law to harmonize its federal common law decisions with general notions of federal law.
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nations restricted to isolated reservations with a poor understanding of
American society, Indian nations are now part of the economic and political
life of the United States. Most reservations are no longer isolated or inhabited only by Indians, and tribal leaders have acquired a sophisticated understanding of the United States legal and political systems. It is, therefore, not
surprising that the law is trying to catch up with these new realities.
Although this can explain why federal Indian law’s exceptionalism is
changing, it does not explain why it is changing in the particular way that it
is. In this Article I contend that one of the reasons animating the Court’s
move away from Justice Marshall’s exceptionalism is its fear that, under
traditional foundational principles of federal Indian law,4 Indian tribes may
gain what the Court subjectively perceives to be “unfair” advantages over
non-Indians. Therefore, the Court has been looking for limiting principles
tending to achieve level playing fields between tribal and non-tribal actors.5
This Article also argues, however, that, while looking for a level playing
field may sound like a worthwhile goal, there are many pitfalls involved in
this process that may end up hurting tribal sovereign interests.
I realize that describing the Court as looking for a “level playing field”
may sound too generous to some, and it is true that, at times, the Court’s
jurisprudence seems animated by unfounded and irrational fears about Indian nations. One area where fear of a non-level playing field has made the
Court overreact has been in the area of tribal jurisdiction over non-members. The foundational principle here was that, although Indian tribes could
no longer be considered foreign nations capable of having independent relations with other foreign nations, they still retained all their original, inherent
sovereign powers unless such powers had been taken away by acts of Congress or given up in treaties entered with the United States.6 However, in
1982, the Court came up with a limiting principle in which Indian tribes
could only exercise those inherent sovereign powers that were “necessary”
to tribal self-government.7 While some pro-tribal attorneys at the time expressed the belief that they could work around this limiting principle, the
4. On foundational principles of federal Indian law, see David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573
(1996).
5. In previous writings, I have argued that the Court was not only conscious that the tribes were
being incorporated as the third sovereign into our federalism but was also aware that Congress was
either unwilling or incapable of adjusting the parameters governing this incorporation. To counter this
perceived congressional paralysis, the Court assumed the lead in defining the terms of this tribal incorporation. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Supreme Court’s Last 30 Years of Federal Indian Law: Looking for Equilibrium or Supremacy?, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 277 (2018).
6. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.01(1)(a), 206–11 (Nell J. Newton, Robert T.
Anderson, Bethany R. Berger, Carole E. Goldberg, John P. LaVelle, Judith V. Royster, Joseph W.
Singer, Kevin Washburn eds., LexisNexis 2012).
7. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
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United States Supreme Court has, in the great majority of cases, refused to
uphold tribal jurisdiction over non-members.8
Because that subject has been already much discussed by a number of
scholars,9 this Article will analyze other areas of federal Indian law—areas
where the application of exceptionalism and foundational principles is especially likely to motivate the Court to search for limiting principles. Thus,
Part II of this Article will focus on tribal sovereign immunity cases, and
Part III will analyze tribal-state conflicts involving off-reservation treaty
rights.10 Finally, Part IV will focus on state taxing power within Indian
reservations. Not only is the judicial search for a level playing field evident
in this area, but the evolution of the law in this area should serve as a
cautionary tale for the areas of law covered in Parts II and III: what started
out as a search for a fair solution between conflicting tribal and state taxing
interests ended up being used to promote state sovereign interests to the
detriment of tribal sovereign and economic interests.
II. THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD PRINCIPLE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CASES

IN

TRIBAL

As stated by the United States Supreme Court, tribal sovereign immunity “is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.”11
Furthermore, only Congress, pursuant to its plenary power, can abrogate
8. See Skibine, supra note 5.
9. The arguably leading article was written by Philip Frickey. See Frickey, supra note 3; see also
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 121 (2006);
Alex Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the Inherent Powers of Indian
Tribes, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77, 83–99 (2014–2015).
10. Not that these are the only two areas where limiting principles are at play. On “limiting principles” in Indian free exercise of religion cases, see Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in American Indian Religious Freedoms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 387 (2012). In Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), for instance, the Court refused to
enjoin the construction of a logging road through an area considered sacred to some Indians. The
Court’s refusal to give constitutional protections to such sites was heavily influenced by the lack of
“limiting principles” in such claims. Thus, the Court stated,
Respondents attempt to stress the limits of the religious servitude that they are now seeking to
impose on the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest . . . . Nothing in the
principle for which they contend, however, would distinguish this case from another lawsuit in
which they (or similarly situated religious objectors) might seek to exclude all human activity
but their own from sacred areas of the public lands . . . . No disrespect for these [religious]
practices is implied when one notes that such beliefs could easily require de facto beneficial
ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public property. Even without anticipating future
cases, the diminution of the Government’s property rights, and the concomitant subsidy of the
Indian religion, would in this case be far from trivial.
Id. at 452–53.
11. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 890
(1986).
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tribal sovereign immunity.12 However, as recently stated by the Court, another governing principle concerning congressional abrogation of tribal
sovereign immunity is that “such a congressional decision must be clear.
The baseline position, we have often held, is tribal immunity; and ‘[t]o abrogate [such] immunity, Congress must “unequivocally” express that purpose.’”13
A. The Level Playing Field and Tribal Sovereign Immunity
in Indian Gaming
Unlike other attributes of tribal sovereignty, notably inherent tribal jurisdiction over non-members, tribal sovereign immunity has, for the most
part, remained unscathed from the Court’s attacks.14 The Court reaffirmed
its support for tribal sovereign immunity in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
Community,15 even though the concept had only received lukewarm support
sixteen years earlier in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies.16 At issue in Bay Mills was whether the State of Michigan could
sue the Tribe for opening a casino on lands that were allegedly not “Indian
lands” under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).17 IGRA made casino gaming on Indian lands legal under certain conditions, one of which
requires tribes to have entered into a gaming compact with the state.18
IGRA also abrogated tribal sovereign immunity so that a state could sue a
tribe alleged to be conducting gaming on Indian lands in violation of the
tribal-state compact.19 The problem facing Michigan in Bay Mills, however,
was that it was alleging that tribal gaming was illegal because it was not
12. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
13. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (2014) (quoting C & L Enters., Inc.
v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001)).
14. For a recent overview of tribal and state sovereign immunity, see Richard B. Collins, To Sue
and Be Sued: Capacity and Immunity of American Indian Nations, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 391, 401–14
(2018).
15. 572 U.S. 782 (2014).
16. 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998), stating,
There are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine. . . . In our interdependent
and mobile society, however, tribal immunity extends beyond what is needed to safeguard
tribal self-governance. This is evident when tribes take part in the Nation’s commerce. Tribal
enterprises now include ski resorts, gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians. In this
economic context, immunity can harm those who are unaware that they are dealing with a
tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity, or who have no choice in the matter, as in the case
of tort victims. These considerations might suggest a need to abrogate tribal immunity, at least
as an overarching rule. . . . we defer to the role Congress may wish to exercise in this important judgment.
17. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 to 2721 (2012).
18. The tribal-state compact provisions are codified at id. § 2710.
19. The abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity is codified at id. § 2710(d)(7)(A).
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conducted on “Indian lands.”20 Yet, IGRA only abrogated sovereign immunity to challenge illegal gaming conducted on “Indian lands.”21 In other
words, there was no abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity to challenge
gaming not conducted on Indian lands.22 The Court in Bay Mills upheld
tribal immunity:
As “domestic dependent nations,” Indian tribes exercise sovereignty subject
to the will of the Federal Government. Sovereignty implies immunity from
lawsuits. Subjection means (among much else) that Congress can abrogate
that immunity as and to the extent it wishes. If Congress had authorized this
suit, Bay Mills would have no valid grounds to object. But Congress has not
done so: The abrogation of immunity in IGRA applies to gaming on, but not
off, Indian lands. We will not rewrite Congress’s handiwork.23

In this area of the law, the limiting principle at first seems fair to Indian nations in that it argues that they should be on a level playing field
with states and therefore have the same degree of sovereign immunity that
states enjoy. In the mid-1980s, when Congress was debating IGRA, the
rallying battle cry of those in Congress opposed to what they perceived as a
pro-tribal gaming bill sponsored by Morris Udall was that they wanted a
“level playing field” when it came to gaming on Indian reservations.24 My
immediate reaction at the time was to question why there should be a level
playing field between tribes and anyone when the gaming was on Indian
reservations. Eventually, I came to accept that the notion of a level playing
field between states and tribes had some merit,25 but only if the tribes were
awarded the same political dignity as states within our federalist system.
The Congress in IGRA ended up crafting a delicate balance between
tribal and state interests, requiring tribes to enter into gaming compacts with
states before gaming could be conducted on their reservations, but also allowing tribes to sue states in federal court if the states failed to negotiate the
compacts in good faith.26
20. 572 U.S. at 787.
21. Id. at 791.
22. IGRA defines “Indian lands” as “all lands within Indian reservations, lands held in trust by the
United States for the benefit of Indians or Indian tribes, and lands held by Indians subject to a restriction
against alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.” 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4).
23. 572 U.S. at 807, 808 (internal citations omitted).
24. At the time, the author was Deputy Counsel for Indian Affairs for the Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, chaired at the time by Congressman Morris Udall.
25. But see Greg Ablavsky, Upper Skagit v. Lundgren: Deceptively Straightforward Case Raises
Fundamental Questions about Native Nations, History, and Sovereignty, Stanford Law School Blogs
(May 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/YU6V-YRHK (commenting on the case and questioning why tribes
should be treated like states when it is to their disadvantage and when, in many other cases, they are not
treated like states when it would be to their advantage).
26. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(c), (d)(7)(i).
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The idea of a level playing field between tribes and states under IGRA
was endorsed by Justice Sotomayor in her concurring opinion in Bay Mills,
stating:
As the principal dissent observes, “comity is about one sovereign respecting
the dignity of another.” This Court would hardly foster respect for the dignity of Tribes by allowing States to sue Tribes for commercial activity on
State lands, while prohibiting Tribes from suing States for commercial activity on Indian lands. Both States and Tribes are domestic governments
who come to this Court with sovereignty that they have not entirely ceded to
the Federal Government.27

The same level playing field idea in the area of gaming had been discussed
in an earlier case, Chickasaw Nation v. United States,28 where Justices
O’Connor and Souter, in dissent, objected to the majority’s holding that
allowed the federal government to tax tribal gaming revenues pursuant to
IGRA. The dissent raised the argument that leveling the playing field with
the states required the tribes to benefit from the same exemption from federal taxation:29
If anything, congressional policy weighs in favor of the Nations. Congress’
central purpose in enacting IGRA was “to provide a statutory basis for the
operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.” Exempting Nations from federal gaming taxation in the same manner as States
preserves the Nations’ sovereignty and avoids giving state gaming a competitive advantage that would interfere with the Nations’ ability to raise revenue in this manner.30

The Court, however, upset the delicate balance Congress struck in IGRA in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,31 holding that Congress could not,
under its Article I powers, abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity so as to allow Indian tribes to bring suit against the states.32
Seminole Tribe highlights one of the potential problems with looking for a
level playing field between tribes and states in the area of sovereign immunity: state sovereign immunity is protected in the Constitution,33 while tribal sovereign immunity is a doctrine of federal common law.34
27. 572 U.S. at 807 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
28. 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
29. Id. at 99 (O’Connor & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
30. Id.
31. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
32. Id. at 76.
33. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
34. See Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998)
(“Though the doctrine of tribal immunity is settled law and controls this case, we note that it developed
almost by accident . . . . The doctrine is said by some of our own opinions to rest on the Court’s opinion
in Turner v. United States.”).
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This means that Congress can only abrogate state sovereign immunity
pursuant to constitutional restrictions,35 while tribal sovereign immunity
may be abrogated by Congress at will. The question remains, however, as to
whether a level playing field between tribes and states can still occur within
these parameters. The odds for that are not that good, at least not as far as
Indian gaming is concerned.36
B. The Level Playing Field with States in Off-Reservation
Sovereign Immunity Cases
In many contentious areas involving tribal versus non-tribal and state
interests, the notion of congressional plenary power in Indian affairs used to
prevent the United States Supreme Court from venturing into uncharted territory and trying to come up with judicial solutions to conflicts that should
be resolved by Congress. Tribal sovereign immunity is such an area. As
stated by Justice Kagan in Bay Mills, “We ruled that way for a single, simple reason: because it is fundamentally Congress’s job, not ours, to determine whether or how to limit tribal immunity. The special brand of sovereignty the tribes retain—both in its nature and its extent—rests in the hands
of Congress.”37
Judicial respect for congressional prerogatives, however, may be waning.38 One good example of this lack of patience with Congress and the
Court’s willingness to treat tribes the same as states for the purpose of
reaching a level playing field is a somewhat surprising opinion by Justice
Sotomayor in Lewis v. Clarke.39 There, the Court refused to extend the
Tribe’s immunity to a tribal employee alleged to have been negligent when
operating a tribal vehicle within the scope of his employment, but on a state
highway located outside the Indian reservation. In coming to its decision,
the Court did mention that “the judgment will not operate against the Tribe.
This is not a suit against Clarke in his official capacity. It is simply a suit
against Clarke to recover for his personal actions, which ‘will not require
action by the sovereign or disturb the sovereign’s property.’”40 However,
the Court also took into account whether similar state employees would
35. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (requiring any such legislation necessary to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to be congruent and proportional to the history of alleged constitutional violations).
36. See New Mexico v. Department of Interior, 854 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2017); Texas v. United
States, 497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007); but see Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, Negotiating Meaningful Concessions
from States in Gaming Compacts to Further Tribal Economic Development Satisfying the “Economic
Benefits” Test, 54 S.D. L. REV. 419 (2009).
37. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty, 572 U.S. 782, 807, 826 (2014).
38. See Skibine, supra note 5.
39. 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017).
40. Id. at 1291.
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have enjoyed the State’s sovereign immunity in such situations.41 After remarking that a state employee would not have enjoyed sovereign immunity
in similar circumstances, the Court stated, “There is no reason to depart
from these general rules in the context of tribal sovereign immunity.”42
The Court also considered a level playing field between tribes and
other sovereigns concerning sovereign immunity in its most recent sovereign immunity decision, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren.43 In that
case, the Tribe had purchased a tract of land that used to be within the
Tribe’s ancestral territory.44 When the Tribe commissioned a survey of the
land, it thought that a fence, put in place by the adjoining landowners to
demarcate their property, was in the wrong place and notified the adjoining
landowners that it intended to remove the fence.45 The neighbors responded
by filing a quiet title action in Washington state court, claiming title by
adverse possession and mutual acquiescence.46 The Tribe answered by
claiming sovereign immunity from such lawsuits.47 After hearing oral arguments, the United States Supreme Court remanded.48 Although the Court
held that the Washington Supreme Court had wrongly interpreted a previous decision as precluding the defense of tribal sovereign immunity,49 it
remanded the case because the non-tribal party had raised an argument at
the United States Supreme Court that had not be raised in the lower courts
or even in the initial cert briefs.50 That argument relied on the “immovable
property” doctrine, a common law doctrine under which “sovereigns enjoyed no immunity from actions involving immovable property located in
the territory of another sovereign.”51
Four Justices joined Justice Gorsuch’s opinion, holding that the case
should be remanded because “[d]etermining the limits on the sovereign immunity held by Indian tribes is a grave question; the answer will affect all
tribes, not just the one before us; and the alternative argument for affirmance did not emerge until late in this case.”52 Only Justices Thomas and
Alito, in dissent, were willing to decide the issue immediately, and for
them, the Tribe’s immunity in this area should be treated just like the im41. Id. at 1290–91.
42. Id. at 1291.
43. 138 S. Ct. 1649 (2018).
44. Id. at 1652.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1655.
49. Id. at 1653 (interpreting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Nation and
Bands of the Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992)).
50. Id. at 1654–55.
51. Id. at 1653.
52. Id. at 1654.
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munity of other sovereigns.53 According to Justices Thomas and Alito,
“The immovable-property exception has been hornbook law almost as long
as there have been hornbooks.”54 Therefore, the defense of sovereign immunity should not be available to the Tribe in this case.
Justice Gorsuch was right, however, that determining whether tribal
sovereign immunity should be larger than that of other sovereigns is a
“grave question,” and one that may “turn[ ] out to be more complicated than
the dissent promises.”55 Whether the immovable property exception rules
the day as far as the States are concerned is very debatable. Justice Roberts,
in his concurrence, asserted that “[t]he same rule applies as a limitation on
the sovereign immunity of states claiming an interest in land located within
other States,”56 but many states have filed amicus briefs with the Court
arguing that the doctrine is antiquated and should no longer be applicable.57
After acknowledging that the only question in this case was “whether
different principles afford Indian tribes a broader immunity [than other sovereigns] from actions involving off-reservation lands,”58 Justice Roberts added, “But if it turns out that the rule does not extend to tribal assertions of
rights in non-trust, non-reservation property, the applicability of sovereign
immunity in such circumstances would, in my view, need to be addressed in
a future case.”59 I have a feeling that, if the lower court on remand finds
that the immovable property doctrine does not apply to the Upper Skagit
Tribe as it does to the State, the level playing field principle will weigh
heavily in influencing the likes of Justices Roberts and Kavanaugh to join
Justices Thomas and Alito should this case makes its way back to the
United States Supreme Court. These four would only need one more to
constitute a majority. If I were the tribal attorney, I would be extremely
apprehensive in bringing this case, or one similar, back to the Court.
That being said, a case about tribal sovereign immunity involving offreservation conduct may already be on the horizon. In Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Authority60 the Alabama Supreme Court held that the Poarch Band of
Creek Indians could not invoke sovereign immunity to protect the Tribe
from a lawsuit filed by non-Indians over an automobile accident that oc53. Id. at 1657 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1654.
56. Id. at 1655 (Roberts & Kennedy, JJ., concurring) (citing Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472,
480–82 (1924)).
57. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Jenn Weddle Guest Post on Upper Skagit Decision,
Turtle Talk (May 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/S55B-FWJZ.
58. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S. Ct. at 1655 (Roberts, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 1656 (Roberts & Kennedy, JJ., concurring).
60. No. CV-15-900057, 2017 WL 4385738 (Ala. Sept. 29, 2017).
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curred outside the reservation.61 The facts are not good for the Tribe. The
non-tribal parties were alleging that a tribal employee driving a tribal vehicle was under the influence of alcohol when her vehicle collided with the
plaintiff’s automobile.62 Because the plaintiffs alleged that tribal officials
were aware of the driver’s drinking problem, they are suing the Tribe for
negligence and wantonness premised on the Tribe’s hiring, retaining, and
supervising of the driver of the vehicle.63
The Alabama Supreme Court was aware that many lower federal
courts had upheld tribal sovereign immunity in similar cases.64 However, it
relied heavily on Justice Kennedy’s dicta in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma to
the effect that there were “reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the
doctrine.”65 It also relied on footnote eight of Justice Kagan’s more recent
Bay Mills opinion to the effect that the United States Supreme Court had
never “specifically addressed (nor as far as we are aware, has Congress)
whether immunity should apply in the ordinary way if a tort victim, or other
plaintiff who has not chosen to deal with a tribe, has no alternative way to
obtain relief for off-reservation commercial conduct.”66 The Tribe has petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. Strangely, the tribal
petition never mentioned whether the plaintiffs could sue the Tribe in tribal
court. Instead, the Tribe addressed Bay Mills’ footnote by pointing out that,
pursuant to Lewis v. Clarke, the plaintiffs had already filed a lawsuit against
the driver of the tribal truck.67 It is highly debatable whether this option will
be enough to satisfy a majority of the Court should the Court decide to take
the case.
C. Problems with Treating Tribes like States when it comes to
Sovereign Immunity: The Allergan Litigation
Another case perhaps making its way to the United States Supreme
Court is the Allergan Restasis litigation. The litigation involves two different fronts. First, Allergan sued in federal court seeking to protect its
Restasis patents.68 Second, Mylan Pharmaceuticals petitioned the Patent
61. Id. at *4.
62. Id. at *1.
63. Id.
64. Id. at *4.
65. Id. at *3 (citing Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Techs, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758
(1998) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). See supra note 16 for the full text of Justice Kennedy’s comment.
66. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty, 572 US. at 807, 826 n.8 (2014)).
67. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 25, Poarch Bank of Creek Indians v. Wilkes (Feb. 16, 2018)
(No. 17-1175). For discussion of Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017) see supra text accompanying
notes 31–34.
68. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2016 WL 1572193, at *2
(E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2016).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol80/iss1/4

R

10

Skibine: Limiting Principles in Federal Indian Law
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-1\MON103.txt

2019

unknown

Seq: 11

15-MAY-19

LIMITING PRINCIPLES IN FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

9:36

77

Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB) for inter partes review (IPR) of the
Restasis patents.69 Inter partes review is an administrative procedure set up
in the America Invents Act to allow the Patents and Trademark Office
(PTO) to review expeditiously the validity of a patent that was previously
awarded.70 After the litigation had started, Allergan and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe notified the federal court and the PTAB that all of Allergan’s
challenged patents had been assigned to the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe and
that the Tribe had granted back to Allergan the exclusive license to the
patents.71 Under the deal, the Tribe received $13.5 million upon execution
of the agreement and will receive $15 million in annual royalties after
that.72
In the federal court proceedings, after ordering the joinder of the Tribe
as a co-plaintiff, the judge was concerned by the lack of a limiting principle
if he upheld tribal sovereign immunity.73 He believed that if Allergan’s tactic was successful others could also use it and this “could spell the end of
the PTO’s IPR program which was a central component of the American
Invents Act of 2011.”74 Although the court eventually held that the Restasis
patents were invalid based on obviousness,75 the ruling concerning obviousness was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.76 Similarly, in the inter partes review, the PTAB refused to dismiss
the proceedings in spite of tribal sovereign immunity.77 The PTAB spent
most of its decision arguing that, because Allergan was the true owner of
the patents and can defend the interest of the Tribe adequately, the IPR
proceedings could continue without the Tribe.78 However, after observing
that the Tribe had not pointed to any authority confirming that the same
principles supporting state sovereign immunity should be applicable to tri69. Mylan Pharm. v. Allergan (Patent Trial and Appeal Board 2016) (No. IPR 2016-01132).
70. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 7, 125 Stat. 284, 313 (2011) (codified
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
71. Pl.’s Notice, Allergan, Inc., 2016 WL 1572193 (Sept. 8, 2017) (No. 2:15-CV-01455-WCB).
72. Order at 1–2, Allergan, Inc., 2016 WL 1572193 (Oct. 6, 2017) (No. 2:15-CV-01455-WCB).
73. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 4, Allergan, Inc., 2016 WL 1572193 (Oct. 16, 2017) (No.
2:15-CV-01455-WCB).
74. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4803941 (E.D.
Tex. 2017). The judge also intimated that if it was up to him, the agreement between the Tribe and
Allergan would be set aside as against public policy. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, at 4.
75. Final Judgment at 1, Allergan, Inc., 2016 WL 1572193 (Oct. 16, 2017) (2:15-CV-01455-WCB).
76. Notice of Appeal at 1, Allergan, Inc., 2016 WL 1572193 (Oct. 27, 2017) (2:15-CV-01455WCB).
77. Decision Denying Tribe’s Motion to Terminate at 18, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (Patent Trial and Appeal Board 2018) (No. IPR2017-01127).
78. Id. at 18–35. The Board also ruled that even if the Tribe had sovereign immunity, it was not an
indispensable party under Rule 19(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at 39. These parts
of the Board’s decision are not the concern of this Article as they involve primarily areas of civil
procedure and patent law that do not implicate tribal interests under federal Indian law.
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bal immunity,79 the Board held that tribal sovereign immunity, generally
speaking, does not apply to IPR-type proceedings.80 To make this argument, the Board argued that IPR proceedings are akin to federal enforcement proceedings brought by a federal agency.81 Just like the lower federal
court’s ruling, the PTAB’s decision was also appealed to the Federal Circuit.82
On appeal from the Board’s decision, the Tribe insisted that tribal sovereign immunity is applicable to IPR proceedings based on the following
arguments.83 First, the Tribe argued that the Board has previously recognized sovereign immunity when invoked by state universities,84 and there
are no meaningful differences between the universities and the Tribe’s invocation of sovereign immunity in this context. Second, sovereign immunity is applicable in federal administrative agency proceedings,85 and inter
partes review is such a proceeding. Third, inter partes review cannot be
categorized as a federal agency enforcement proceeding where sovereign
immunity would not be available.86
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit did not
agree with the Tribe’s arguments.87 Instead, relying partly on a recent
United States Supreme Court case for the proposition that IPR is a matter
“which arise[s] between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the
executive or legislative departments,”88 it agreed with the appellees that
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id. at 10.
81. Id. at 13–15.
82. See Brief of Appellants, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 2018 WL 1989302
(Fed. Cir. April 18, 2018) (Nos. 18-1638 to 1643).
83. Brief of Appellants at 15–35, Allergan, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 2018 WL 1989302 (Fed.
Cir. April 18, 2018) (Nos. 18-1638 to 1643).
84. See id. (citing Order Dismissing Petitions for Inter Partes Review Based on Sovereign Immunity 39, Covidien, LP v. University of Fla. (Patent Trial and Appeal Board 2017) (No. IPR2016-01274);
Decision Granting Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss and Terminating Inter Partes Review 20, NeoChord Inc., v. University of Md. (Patent Trial and Appeal Board 2017) (No. IPR2016-00208); Decision
Granting in Part Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss 17, Reactive Surfaces, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp.
(Patent Trial and Appeal Board July 2017) (No. IPR2016-01914)).
85. See id. at 21 (citing Federal Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,
754–56 (2002)).
86. Id. The Tribe also continued to argue that the Board was wrong in holding that Allergan was the
effective patent owner and, therefore, could not be withdrawn as a party to the proceedings. Id. at 35–52.
Similarly, the Tribe argued that the Board was wrong to find that even if Allergan was the effective
patent owner, the Tribe was not an indispensable party under the Rule 19(B) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Id. at 52–58.
87. See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
88. Id. at 1326–27 (quoting Oil States Energy Servs, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp, LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1373 (2018) (upholding the constitutionality of inter partes review because the revocation of a
previously granted patent involved adjudication of a public right and, therefore, could be delegated to a
non-Article III Court)).
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sovereign immunity was not applicable to the IPR process.89 The court began by stating “IPR is neither clearly a judicial proceeding instituted by a
private party nor clearly an enforcement action brought by the federal government. It is a ‘hybrid proceeding’ with ‘adjudicatory characteristics’ similar to court proceedings, but in other respects it is . . . more like a specialized agency proceeding.’”90 Therefore, the court concluded that “IPR is
more like an agency enforcement action than a civil suit brought by a private party.”91 As such, tribal immunity was not implicated.92 Whether the
court is correct in its conclusion that IPR is more like an agency enforcement action is beyond the scope of this article.93 In some ways, the ground
used by the court may be one of the least harmful to tribal interests generally speaking, as this rationale should not impact tribal sovereign immunity
beyond the narrow confines of IPR proceedings.
This Article does not take a position on the wisdom of the tribal-Allergan agreement from a social policy perspective.94 Nor does it take a position on whether sovereign immunity should generally be available to either
states or tribes in such cases.95 However, because this Article argues that
there should be a level playing field between the Tribes and the States, the
concern here is that, although the Tribe lost on the sovereign immunity
issue, eventually, in a like case, the States may not. Therefore, this Article
will next focus on whether there are meaningful differences between invocation of state and tribal sovereign immunity in the patent IPR context.
An argument made by the appellees in their brief was that tribal sovereign immunity should not apply to the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe in this case
because the agreement with Allergan was a “sham” devised to avoid the
89. Id. at 1327.
90. Id. at 1326 (quoting Cuzzo Speed Techs., LLC. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44 (2016)).
91. Id. at 1327.
92. Id. The Court stated, “[t]he Director’s important role as a gatekeeper and the Board’s authority
to proceed in the absence of the parties convinces us that the USPTO is acting as the United States in its
role as a superior sovereign to reconsider a prior administrative grant and protect the public interest in
keeping patent monopolies ‘within their legitimate scope.’ ” (internal citation omitted).
93. The Court essentially gave four reasons for its conclusion. First, the Agency makes the ultimate
decision whether to institute the review proceedings. Id. at 1327. Second, The Board may choose to
continue the review even if the petitioner chooses not to participate. Id. at 1328. Third, the procedures
used by the PTAB do not mirror the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Fourth, IPR may not be “a
proceeding in which Congress contemplated tribal immunity to apply.” Id. at 1329. That last ground is
somewhat perplexing as the general rule is that Congress has to explicitly abrogate tribal immunity for it
not to apply.
94. For arguments that this agreement may not have been such a good idea, see Cecilia (Yixi)
Cheng & Theodore T. Lee, When Patents are Sovereigns: The Competitive Harms of Leasing Tribal
Immunity, 127 YALE L.J. 848 (2018).
95. Although there are some good arguments against applying tribal or state sovereign immunity in
this area. See, e.g., the concurring opinion of Judge Bisk in Order Denying Patent Owner’s Motion to
Dismiss, Opinion Concurring 5–6, Ericsson Inc., v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. (Patent Trial and
Appeal Board Dec. 19, 2017) (No. IPR2017-01186) (Bisk, J., concurring).
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patents being challenged in agency or court proceedings.96 Although the
PTAB and the Federal Circuit did not address this argument, the federal
district court judge in the parallel federal court proceeding stated:
The Court has serious concerns about the legitimacy of the tactic that Allergan and the Tribe have employed. The essence of the matter is this: Allergan
purports to have sold the patents to the Tribe, but in reality it has paid the
Tribe to allow Allergan to purchase—or perhaps more precisely, to rent—
the Tribe’s sovereign immunity in order to defeat the pending IPR proceedings in the PTO.97

In order to buy into this line of reasoning, a court would first have to
distinguish cases where state universities have successfully invoked their
sovereign immunity in IPR proceedings.98 It is true that state universities
are usually involved in the development of patents while Indian tribes are
not. In their appeals brief, for instance, the Appellees took the Tribe to task
for suggesting that it has done “nothing more than follow the model created
by state universities,” stating:
That is not so. State universities’ patent portfolios are often derived from
research funded by the State, while the Tribe funded none of the research
and development involving these patents . . . . The Tribe was a complete
stranger to Restasis (and to pharmaceutical patents in general) until Allergan
paid it to enter into a transaction after the close of evidence in these IPRs.99

Although some of the cases like Covidian and Eriksson did not involve
any “transfer” of patents to universities,100 others like Reactive Surface101
and NeoChord102 did. However, the university cases so far have not involved patents being transferred to a state university so that it could license
them back in order for the licensee to benefit from the licensor’s sovereign
immunity. On the other hand, it is true that in non-IPR contexts, the States
have previously manipulated their sovereign immunity in order to avoid
liability. For instance, in their appellate brief to the Seventh Circuit, the
96. See Appellee’s Brief at 27, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 2018 WL
2234327 (Fed. Cir. May 11, 2018) (No. 18-1638).
97. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *2
(E.D. Tex. 2017). The Court also stated, however, that the tribal sovereign immunity issue was not
before it but should be decided in the PTAB proceedings. Id. at *4.
98. See Neochord Inc., v. University of Md. (Patent Trial and Appeal Board 2017) (No. IPR201600208); Reactive Surfaces, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp. (Patent Trial and Appeal Board 2016) (No. IPR
2017-00572).
99. See Appellee’s Brief at 25, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 2018 WL
2234327 (Fed. Cir. May 11, 2018) (No. 18-1638).
100. See Petition for Inter Partes Review, Covidien, LP, v. University of Fla. Research Found.
(Patent Trial and Appeal Board 2017) (No. IPR2016-01274); Petition for Inter Partes Review, Ericsson
Inc., v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. (Patent Trial and Appeal Board 2017) (No. IPR2017-01186).
101. See Petition for Inter Partes Review, Reactive Surfaces, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp. (Patent
Trial and Appeal Board 2016) (No. IPR2016-01914).
102. See Petition for Inter Partes Review, NeoChord Inc., v. University of Md. (Patent Trial and
Appeal Board 2017) (No. IPR2016-00208).
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Tribe cited four cases for the proposition that other sovereigns also use
immunity to avoid liability in pending lawsuits.103 While the first two cited
cases, Oracle America and Kroll, can be distinguished on their facts, the
last two cannot as they involve transfer of liability from a non-sovereign to
a state entity that resulted in successful assertion of state sovereign immunity. In Cabrero, especially, the transfer was done for the very purpose of
avoiding liability.104
Allowing sovereign immunity to be invoked in some cases but not in
others would mean having a court dictate to a sovereign when use of sovereign immunity is proper. That is problematic. Tribes, like other sovereigns,
are involved in myriad economic activities. This means that if courts were
left to dictate to Tribes when the use of sovereign immunity is proper, the
United States Supreme Court would have to devise a test to distinguish
among those. This is exactly what the Court refused to do in Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma when it did not restrict the use of tribal sovereign immunity for
cases involving tribal commercial activities and arising outside Indian reservations.105
A more serious argument made by the appellees in their brief to the
Federal Circuit was that, even if state universities can invoke sovereign immunity in such cases, tribes cannot because unlike state sovereign immunity, which is mandated under the Eleventh Amendment to protect norms of
federalism, tribal sovereign immunity is only a doctrine of federal common
law.106 The Federal Circuit refused to enter this debate, concluding
that,“[i]n this case we are only deciding whether tribal immunity applies in
IPR. While we recognize there are many parallels, we leave for another day
the question of whether there is any reason to treat state sovereign immunity differently.”107 The reluctance of the Federal Circuit to make a pronouncement on the application of state sovereign immunity is puzzling because recent decisions of the PTAB have already held that state sovereign

103. Brief of Appellants at 32–33, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 2018 WL
1989302 (Fed. Cir. April 18, 2018) (citing Oracle Am., Inc. v. Oregon Health Ins. Exch. Corp., 145 F.
Supp. 3d 1018, 1042–43 (D. Or. 2015); Kroll v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 910 (7th
Cir. 1991); Surprenant v. Massachusetts Tpk. Auth., 768 F. Supp. 2d 312, 318 (D. Mass. 2011);
Maysonet-Robles v. Cabrero, 323 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 2003)).
104. 323 F.3d at 51 (dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds when assets of non-sovereign entity
were transferred during the litigation to a sovereign entity created solely for purpose of asserting sovereign immunity).
105. 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998). This holding was reaffirmed more recently in Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Cmty., 124 U.S. 2024, 2040 (2014).
106. Appellee’s Brief at 17–24, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 2018 WL
2234327 (Fed. Cir. May 11, 2018) (No. 18-1638).
107. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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immunity is applicable to inter partes review,108 as it did in Vas-Cath Incorporated v. Curators of the University of Missouri.109
Congress may, in fact, lack the constitutional authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity for the purpose of inter partes review. The United
States Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida held that Congress could
not abrogate state sovereign immunity under its Article I powers.110 Therefore, neither the Patent Clause,111 nor the Commerce Clause,112 is a legitimate source of power for Congress in this area. This leaves Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment113 as the only potential source of authority. However, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,114 the United States Supreme Court held that, even if the
Patent Remedy Act was enacted under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it still could not meet the City of Boerne congruent and
proportionality test and was, therefore, not “appropriate” legislation under
Section 5.115 The PTAB in Neochord v. University of Maryland followed
suit and held that Congress could not have abrogated state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it established the
IPR procedures.116 The Allergan litigation, therefore, may be another example where treating tribes like states in the hope of reaching a level playing
field may just not be possible because of constitutional constraints.
III. LIMITING PRINCIPLES

IN

OFF-RESERVATION INDIAN TREATY CASES

A foundational principle of treaty interpretation is that treaties made
with Indian nations are to be construed the way the Indians understood
them at the time of the signing.117 Furthermore, ambiguous expressions are
108. See Order Dismissing Petitions for Inter Partes Review Based on Sovereign Immunity at 3,
Covidien, LP, v. University of Fla. (Patent Trial and Appeal Board 2017) (No. IPR2016-01274); Decision Granting Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss and Terminating Inter Partes Review at 2, NeoChord
Inc., v. University of Md. (Patent Trial and Appeal Board 2017) (No. IPR2016-00208); Decision Granting in Part Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss at 2, Reactive Surfaces, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp.
(Patent Trial and Appeal Board July 2017) (No. IPR2016-01914); Order Denying Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss at 4, Ericsson Inc., v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. (Patent Trial and Appeal Board Dec.
19, 2017) (No. IPR2017-01186).
109. 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
110. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
111. This clause gives Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors exclusive Rights to their respective writings and
Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
112. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
113. “The Congress shall have power to enforce this Article by appropriate legislation.” Id. § 5.
114. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
115. See id. at 647.
116. Decision Granting Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss and Terminating Inter Partes Review at
12, NeoChord Inc. v. University of Md. (Patent Trial and Appeal Board 2017) (No. IPR2016-00208).
117. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 (1999).
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supposed to be interpreted to the Indians’ benefit.118 Finally, although only
Congress can abrogate Indian treaties, a treaty will only be considered abrogated if a court finds clear evidence that Congress actually considered the
Indians’ treaty rights and decided to abrogate them.119
Limiting principles tending to achieve a level playing field between
tribes and states have been at play in regulations of hunting and fishing
treaty rights. Thus, states have been allowed to regulate tribal fishing rights,
both off and even on Indian reservations, as long as the regulations are both
necessary for the conservation of a scarce renewable natural resource and
do not discriminate against tribal members.120 A good example of a limiting
principle in this area was the use of the term “moderate living” by Justice
Stevens in a 1979 Washington treaty fishing case.121 After agreeing that the
1855 Treaty of Point Elliott reserved to seven Indian tribes up to 50% of the
harvestable fish resource, Justice Stevens added:
It bears repeating, however, that the 50% figure imposes a maximum but not
a minimum allocation . . . . the central principle here must be that Indian
treaty rights to a natural resource that once was thoroughly and exclusively
exploited by the Indians secures so much as, but no more than, is necessary
to provide the Indians with a livelihood—that is to say, a moderate living.122

No one seems to really know where Justice Stevens derived this “moderate living” standard, although some speculate that he just came up with it
in order to persuade other Justices to join his opinion. As explained by the
late Dean David Getches, Justice Stevens added the “moderate living standard” language in a later draft of his opinion, though it was “an idea not
offered by any party or suggested in any of the briefs . . . . Chief Justice
Burger characterized Stevens’ approach as “an ‘arbitration’ holding,” and
thus Stevens secured a majority vote.”123
The “moderate living” standard became a source of controversy during
the United States Supreme Court’s oral argument in the recently heard “culverts case.”124 At issue in the case was whether the State of Washington had
a duty to modify many of its culverts so as to allow salmon to pass
118. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970).
119. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739–40 (1986).
120. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of the State of Washington, 433 U.S. 165,
174–77 (1977).
121. Washington v. Washington State Comm. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 686
(1979).
122. Id. at 686.
123. David Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court
in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1638–39 (1996).
124. See Oral Argument Transcript 35:8–11, Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (mem.)
(U.S. 2018) (No. 17-269).
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through.125 The Ninth Circuit held that, in building and maintaining barrier
culverts, Washington had violated its obligations under the treaties.126 At
the oral argument, it seemed that a majority of the Justices were attempting
to find a limiting principle defining the scope of the State’s duty to prevent
its activities from reducing the salmon runs. The State argued that the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion had no limiting principle on the treaty right of the Tribes,
and, if left intact, the opinion would allow the tribes to regulate all activities
within the State that may have an impact on the salmon population.127
One area of disagreement between the Tribes and the State was
whether the Ninth Circuit had used the “moderate living” standard in order
to hold that the State of Washington had a duty to repair hundreds of culverts preventing or impairing the salmon from passing through. The problem was that the Ninth Circuit panel decision was far from pellucid on this
point. On one hand, it first stated that “even in the absence of an explicit
promise [by Governor Stevens], we would infer a promise that the number
of fish would always be sufficient to provide a ‘moderate living’ to the
Tribes.”128 However, it followed that by stating, “The ‘measure of the
State’s obligation’ therefore depends ‘on all the facts presented’ in the particular dispute now before us.”129 While this statement seems to call for an
ad-hoc fact-intensive inquiry without a precise standard, the Ninth Circuit
concluded:
The facts presented in the district court establish that Washington has acted
affirmatively to build and maintain barrier culverts under its roads . . . . If
these culverts were replaced or modified to allow free passage of fish, several hundred thousand additional mature salmon would be produced every
year. Many of these mature salmon would be available to the Tribes for
harvest. Salmon now available for harvest are not sufficient to provide a
“moderate living” to the Tribes.130

So, what exactly was the role of the “moderate living” standard? When
the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for re-hearing en banc, Judges Fletcher
and Gould, both members of the panel decision, strongly objected to the
dissent characterizing their holding as guaranteeing the tribal fishermen a
moderate living standard:
125. United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 962 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court also agreed with
previous findings that there had been a substantial degradation of the salmon habitat causing a significant reduction in the number of salmons and that the barrier culverts were a primary cause of the fish
habitat degradation. Id. at 961.
126. Id. at 966.
127. Oral Argument Transcript 4:11–19, Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (mem.) (U.S.
2018) (No. 17-269).
128. Washington, 853 F.3d at 965.
129. Id. at 966.
130. Id.
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Our opinion does not hold that the Tribes are entitled to enough salmon to
provide a moderate living, irrespective of the circumstances . . . . Nor do we
hold that the promise is valid against all human-caused diminutions, or even
against all State-caused diminutions. We hold only that the State violated
the Treaties when it acted affirmatively to build roads across salmon bearing
streams, with culverts that allowed passage of water but not passage of
salmon.131

During the oral argument before the United States Supreme Court, the
United States and the Tribes denied advocating that the State of Washington
had a duty to make sure that Indian fishermen could achieve a “moderate
living standard” through fishing activities.132 But if that is not the standard
for the State’s duty, what is?
An analysis of the Ninth Circuit decision reveals that it relied upon
two main arguments. First, the treaties at issue had to be construed the way
the Indians understood it.133 As stated by the Ninth Circuit:
The Indians did not understand the Treaties to promise that they would have
access to their usual and accustomed fishing places, but with a qualification
that would allow the government to diminish or destroy the fish runs. Governor Stevens did not make, and the Indians did not understand him to
make, such a cynical and disingenuous promise. The Indians reasonably understood Governor Stevens to promise not only that they would have access
to their usual and accustomed fishing places, but also that there would be
fish sufficient to sustain them. They reasonably understood that they would
have, in Stevens’ words, “food and drink . . . forever.”134

Second, these treaties had to be interpreted in a manner consistent with
fulfilling their “purpose.”135 The purpose of the Stevens Treaties was to
guarantee the Indians an adequate or sufficient supply of fish to feed themselves.136
The problem for the State was that, in the lower courts, it had argued
that it had no duty whatsoever to protect the Tribes’ treaty rights from potentially nefarious, state-initiated activities.137 At the United States Supreme
Court, however, it seemed to change course and when asked if there were
any limits on state activities tending to reduce the salmon population, the
Washington State Attorney General first mentioned that the State could not
erect a barrier “causing a large decline in a particular river that is not justi131. United States v. Washington, 864 F.3d 1017, 1020 (9th Cir. 2017).
132. Oral Argument Transcript 35:8–11, 57:4–9, 60:9–14, Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
1832 (mem.) (U.S. 2018) (No. 17-269).
133. Washington, 853 F.3d at 963.
134. Id. at 964.
135. Id. at 965.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 962.
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fied by substantial compelling interests.”138 When pushed further about
what is meant by a “large” decline, the State Attorney General mentioned
that the State could not do something that would cause a substantial degradation of the salmon habitat resulting in a reduction of the number of
salmons by 50% or more.139
According to the State, because all parties modified the arguments in
their briefs to the Court, the case should be remanded once the Court decided which standard would control the State’s duty.140 The Court’s affirmance of the Ninth Circuit decision by an equal 4-4 vote shows that the Justices may have been hopelessly deadlocked as to what that standard or limiting principle should be.141
Limiting principles came into play in Cougar Den, Incorporated v.
Washington State Department of Licensing,142 a case the United States Supreme Court decided this term.143 At stake in the case was whether the State
of Washington could impose on a tribal corporation a tax on fuel transported on state highways.144 Cougar Den, a tribally-owned corporation, was
arguing that Article III of an 1855 treaty, securing to tribal members “the
right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public
highways,”145 preempted the state fuel tax. The State disagreed, arguing
that what is being taxed is the possession of fuel as soon as it is delivered
within the State.146 The State also argued that this case is not about the right
to travel, but primarily about the right to trade, which is not one of those
rights guaranteed under the Treaty.147 The Tribe disagreed, arguing that the
right to trade is, in some cases such as this one, subsumed in the right to
travel.148 The Washington Supreme Court agreed with the Tribe.149 After
stating that the Treaty has to be interpreted the way the Indians understood
138. Oral Argument Transcript 5:11–14, Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (mem.) (U.S.
2018) (No. 17-269). The United States answered that under established Supreme Court precedent, the
State could only regulate the salmon runs for the purpose of conservation. Oral Argument Transcript
46:12–25, Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (mem.) (U.S. 2018) (No. 17-269)., relying on a
trio of Puyallup decisions, the most notable being Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of the State of
Washington, 433 U.S. 165, 174–177 (1977).
139. Oral Argument Transcript 14:15–21, Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (mem.)
(U.S. 2018) (No. 17-269).
140. Oral Argument Transcript 33:10–18, Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (mem.)
(U.S. 2018) (No. 17-269).
141. Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018) (affirming by an equally divided Court).
142. 392 P.3d 1014, 1015 (Wash. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
143. Washington State Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019).
144. Cougar Den, Inc., 392 P.3d at 1015.
145. Treaty with the Yakima, art. 3, Yakima-U.S., June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951.
146. Brief of the Respondent at 26–27, Washington State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.,
2018 WL 4504294 (U.S. Sept. 17, 2018) (No. 16-1498).
147. Cougar Den, Inc., 392 P.3d at 1016.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1020.
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it at the time of the signing, the Washington Supreme Court remarked that,
at the time the Treaty was signed, the right to travel for the purpose of
bringing goods to and from the reservation was essential to the Indians.150
On the other hand, the dissent stated:
[W]hat this ruling puts at risk is Washington’s, and potentially other states’,
ability to tax goods consumed within its borders. A simple extension of the
majority’s logic would allow nontribal members to avoid the imposition of
state use, excise, or sales tax on goods they consume through a contrived
transport by Yakama Nation or Nez Perce tribal members. The majority
provides no clear limits. Transport is necessary to bring many goods to market.151

In its brief to the United States Supreme Court, the State of Washington picked up on the dissent’s argument and argued that if the Court were to
adopt the Washington Supreme Court’s position that any trade that requires
the use of public roads involves the right to travel, “the consequences for
state and federal taxing powers [would] be immense.”152 Therefore, the
State urged the Court to adopt the principle that any exemptions from state
taxes imposed on off-reservation activities should be expressly authorized
under federal law.153 The United States Supreme Court disagreed and held
that the state tax was preempted by the treaty. The court did come up with
some limiting principles in stating that the treaty did not deprive the State of
the power to regulate in the areas of health, safety, actual conservation, or
impose taxes on the tribe in other areas of reservation activities.154
Herrera v. Wyoming155 is another case involving off-reservation treaty
rights that the Court will decide this term.156 In the case, Mr. Herrera, a
member of the Crow Tribe, received a citation from Wyoming for hunting
in the Big Horn National Forest where he had killed three elks during the
off-season while outside the reservation.157 Herrera pleaded not guilty, contending that he was exercising his hunting rights pursuant to Article IV of

150. Id. at 1017.
151. Id. at 1024–25 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting). The dissent also added, “Does this mean all goods
transported to market by Yakama Nation members, regardless of the identity of the buyer and the purpose of transport, are exempt from state tax? Nothing indicates any of the parties understood the Treaty
of 1855 to provide for such a right. Yet the majority’s ruling seems to create just such a right.” Id. at
1025.
152. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 145, at 39.
153. Id. at 18–20.
154. Washington State Dep’t, 139 S. Ct. at 1014.
155. Case No. 2016-242 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. 2016), cert granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018)
156. Id.
157. Order at 3, Herrera v. Wyoming, https://perma.cc/ZYJ2-SATV (Wyo. Apr. 25, 2017) (No.
2016-242).
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the 1868 Treaty between the United States and the Crow Tribe.158 In that
treaty, the Crow Tribe ceded vast amounts of land to the United States but
in Article IV, it insisted that tribal members shall continue to “have the
right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States.”159
In its Brief in Opposition to Herrera’s petition, the State of Wyoming
first argued that the plaintiff-appellant’s case was barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel as the identical issue had already been decided by the
Tenth Circuit in a 1995 case.160 In Crow Indian Tribe v. Repsis,161 the
Tenth Circuit held that under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Ward v. Racehorse,162 the Crow Tribe’s treaty rights were abrogated upon
Wyoming’s admission into the Union “on an equal footing” with the original thirteen colonies.163 The tribal plaintiff, in his petition, argued that a
subsequent decision by the Court, Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,164 had overturned Ward v. Racehorse.165 Therefore, res judicata should not bar the litigation. The State countered that Mille Lacs did
not completely overturn the Racehorse decision.166 Therefore, the issue was
precluded.167
Should the Tribe convince the Court that the Mille Lacs decision completely overturned Racehorse and, therefore, the treaty right survived Montana’s admission into the Union, the Court may have to decide the core
treaty interpretation issue: did the creation of a national forest terminate the
status of the land on which Herrera was hunting as “unoccupied lands of the
United States?”168 Herrera and the United States take the position that the
term “unoccupied lands of the United States” refers to lands that have not
been settled by non-Indians under the Homestead laws.169 On the other
158. Brief for Petitioner at 23–40, Herrera v. State of Wyoming, 2018 WL 4293381 (U.S. Sept. 4,
2018) (No. 17-532) (citing Treaty with the Crows, 1868, art. 4, Crow-U.S., May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649
(1868)).
159. 15 Stat. at 650.
160. Brief in Opposition at 1, Herrera v. State of Wyoming, 2017 WL 5478239 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2017)
(No. 17-532) (citing Crow Indian Tribe v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 992–93 (10th Cir. 1995)).
161. 73 F.3d 982.
162. 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
163. Repsis, 73 F.3d at 993.
164. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
165. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 156, at 31.
166. Brief in Opposition, supra note 158, at 19.
167. It must be noted that the Repsis court also held that even if the treaty right survived admission
of Montana in the Union, the lands were no longer unoccupied since they were now part of a National
Forest. 73 F.3d at 993.
168. Even if the Tribe wins on this point, the State could still argue on remand that the State’s
hunting restrictions were necessary for the purpose of conservation and were not discriminatory against
the Crow tribal members.
169. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12–15, Herrera v. State of Wyoming, 2018 WL
2357739 (U.S. May 22, 2018) (No. 17-532).
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hand, the State is arguing that lands comprising a national forest can no
longer be settled, and, therefore, these lands are no longer unoccupied.170
The United States is also arguing that hunting is not incompatible with
the creation of a national forest.171 Except for Repsis, most of the lower
courts that have considered the issue have ruled that continued hunting is
not per se inconsistent with the creation of a national forest, at least if there
is no active logging occurring in it.172 Creation of a national park, on the
other hand, does terminate the “unoccupied” status of the land as continued
hunting would be inconsistent with one of the major purposes of a national
park.173 The different treatment between national forest and national park
adopted by most courts that have considered this issue seems fair and rational.
IV. A CAUTIONARY TALE: STATE TAXATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD PRINCIPLE

AND

The foundational principle here is that states used to have no jurisdiction whatsoever inside Indian country.174 However, 127 years after first denying states any kind of jurisdiction, the Court formulated a new test in its
1959 decision in Williams v. Lee,175 when it stated, “Essentially, absent
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state
actions infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them.”176 Although the Court stated that “the question has
always been” whether state action infringed on tribal self-government, this
was really a novel way to phrase the question. Until then, the Court had
only allowed states to assume jurisdiction in three types of situations. The
first involved criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who had committed
crimes against other non-Indians inside Indian reservations.177 Second, the
170. Brief for Respondent, Herrera v. State of Wyoming, 2018 WL 6012360, at *21 (U.S. Nov. 13,
2018) (No. 17-532).
171. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 167, at 15.
172. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Maison, 262 F. Supp. 871, 873 (D.
Or. 1966); Idaho v. Tinno, 497 P.2d 1386, 1391 (Idaho 1972); Idaho v. Arthur, 261 P.2d 135, 141 (Idaho
1953); Washington v. Buchanan, 978 P.2d 1070, 1082 (Wash. 1999); Washington v. Wallahee, 255 P.
94 (Wash. 1927).
173. United States. v. Hicks, 587 F. Supp. 1162, 1165–66 (W.D. Wash. 1984); United States v.
Peterson, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1319 (D. Mont. 2000) (holding that creation of national park abrogated
treaty hunting rights); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 510 (1896) (suggesting that Yellowstone
National Park is not “unoccupied”); see H. Barry Holt, Can Indians Hunt in National Parks? Determinable Indian Treaty Rights and United States v. Hicks, 16 ENVTL. L. 207, 252 (1986).
174. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832).
175. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
176. 358 U.S. at 220.
177. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326
U.S. 496, 499 (1946).
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Court had allowed reservation Indians to sue non-Indians in state courts.178
Third, the Court had also allowed state taxation of non-Indian property inside Indian reservations when such taxation would not interfere with treaty
rights possessed by Indians.179
The issue in Williams was not about the reach of state taxing power but
whether a non-Indian could sue a tribal member residing on the Navajo
Reservation in a state court to collect on a debt the tribal member had incurred while on the Reservation.180 Having laid down the test described
above, the United States Supreme Court denied the state court jurisdiction
because it found that allowing the state to exercise jurisdiction would infringe on tribal authority to regulate tribal affairs and undermine the role of
the tribal court in regulating those affairs.181 That test became known as the
“infringement” test. In 1973, however, the Court appeared to adopt a new
test, stating:
The trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a
bar to state jurisdiction, and toward the reliance on federal preemption. The
modern cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notion of Indian sovereignty and to look instead at the applicable treaties and statutes which defines the limits of state power.182

Although at first it seemed that this new “Indian preemption” test was
moving away from the search for a level playing field and towards a search
for congressional intent, the Court veered back toward a balancing-of-theinterest test, holding that the Indian preemption inquiry is “not dependent
on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has
called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal and
tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the
specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal
law.”183
Eventually, the infringement and the Indian preemption tests merged
into one flexible balancing inquiry. Thus, in New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe184 the Court declared, “State jurisdiction is preempted by the
operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and
tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake are
sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority.”185 In a later case, Jus178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 444 (1926); Felix v. Patrick 145 U.S. 317 (1892).
Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 33 (1885); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 274–75 (1898).
358 U.S. at 218.
Id. at 223.
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).
462 U.S. 324 (1980).
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334.
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tice Ginsburg explained the value of a balancing test for reaching a level
playing field in this area of the law:
Balancing tests have been criticized as rudderless, affording insufficient guidance to decisionmakers. Pointed as the criticism may be, one must ask, as
in life’s choices generally, what is the alternative. The principle of tribal
self-government, grounded in notions of inherent sovereignty and in congressional policies, seeks an accommodation between the interests of the
Tribes, and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State,
on the other. No “bright line” test is capable of achieving such an accommodation with respect to state taxes formally imposed on non-Indians, but impacting on-reservation ventures.186

Generally speaking, the Court has highlighted four essential factors in
determining whether state law has been preempted under this balancing test.
Weighing in favor of tribal interests and therefore indicating preemption
are: first, whether there is a “backdrop” of tribal sovereignty and immunity
from state regulation in the area being regulated,187 and second, whether the
activity the state wants to regulate involves a value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribe.188 On the other hand, state interests
are more important when the activity occurring on the reservation could
have serious off-reservation effects.189 Finally, the Court has stated that
“[t]he exercise of state authority which imposes additional burdens on a
tribal enterprise must ordinarily be justified by functions or services performed by the State in connection with the on-reservation activity.”190
The formulation and application of the Indian preemption test was initially heavily influenced by Justice Thurgood Marshall. The use of the balancing test in the opinions where he was in the majority reflected a legitimate effort to find a level playing field between tribal interests on one hand
and state interests on the other.191 It is important to realize, however, that
Justice Rehnquist never believed in a balancing test. In a concurring and
dissenting opinion in Washington v. Confederated Tribes, he objected to
186. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 124–25 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
187. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 725 (1983) (allowing state liquor regulations on the reservations because there was no backdrop tribal immunity from state jurisdiction in this regulatory area).
188. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 219 (1987) (denying state
jurisdiction over Indian gaming and finding that the tribes were not merely marketing an exemption
from state law but had “built modern facilities which provide recreational opportunities and ancillary
services to their patrons”).
189. See Rice, 463 U.S. at 719, 724 (finding that liquor sales on the reservations do have a spillover
effect outside the reservations).
190. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983).
191. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Central Mach. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160
(1980); Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324; California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(1987).
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any balancing, stating, “I see no need for this Court to balance the state and
tribal interests in enacting particular forms of taxation in order to determine
their validity. Absent discrimination, the question is only one of congressional intent. Either Congress intended to pre-empt the state taxing authority or it did not.”192 In that same 1980 case, Justice White gave a meaningful hint on what was preoccupying some of the Justices at the time. The
case was about the power of the State of Washington to tax non-members
buying cigarettes from tribal retailers on the reservation. In upholding state
taxing authority, Justice White stated:
It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smokeshops to persons coming from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities
in which the Tribes have a significant interest. What the smokeshops offer
these customers, and what is not available elsewhere, is solely an exemption
from state taxation . . . . We do not believe that principles of federal Indian
law, whether stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do their business elsewhere.193

At first, this language seems to fit into the level playing field principle
between states and tribes. However, it is far from it. If it were consistent,
Indian tribes should be able to force states to collect tribal tax from off
reservation vendors selling to people residing on Indian reservations. Secondly, this “marketing an exemption” principle has no application to state
residents purchasing goods outside their own state of residence. People living in the Maryland and Virginia suburbs routinely buy their liquor in the
District of Columbia because it is cheaper there. Many people residing in
the State of Washington buy expensive goods in Oregon because Oregon
has no sales tax. The “marketing an exemption” principle is not about levelling the playing field. If anything, it is about un-leveling the field to subrogate tribal interests to the interests of the States.
Justice White may not have wanted the Tribes to benefit from what he
perceived to be an unfair advantage, but in allowing state taxation in that
case, the Court gave a disincentive for anyone but the Tribe’s members to
buy cigarettes on the reservation. The concurring and dissenting opinion of
Justice Stewart made a valid point, stating:
[W]hen a State and an Indian tribe tax in a functionally identical manner the
same on-reservation sales to nontribal members, it is my view that congressional policy conjoined with the Indian Commerce Clause requires the State
192. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 177 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. at 155 (emphasis added). The Court added, “The
Tribes assert the power to create such exemptions by imposing their own taxes or otherwise earning
revenues by participating in the reservation enterprises. If this assertion were accepted, the Tribes could
impose a nominal tax and open chains of discount stores at reservation borders, selling goods of all
descriptions at deep discounts and drawing custom from surrounding areas.” Id.
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to credit against its own tax the amount of the tribe’s tax . . . . [I]t permits
the tribe to share with the State in the tax revenues from cigarette sales,
without at the same time placing the tribe’s federally encouraged enterprises
at a competitive disadvantage compared to similarly situated off-reservation
businesses.194

Unfortunately for the Tribes, although Justice Marshall’s version of
the Indian preemption inquiry initially carried the day, a version of that
inquiry less favorable to tribal interests seemed to have prevailed in more
recent times. In the last thirty years, there have been many cases allowing
state taxation in Indian country.195 While the Court used a balancing-of-theinterest test to determine the extent of state taxation of non-members up to
1989, it essentially abandoned any attempt at real balancing in Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico.196 The issue in Cotton Petroleum was
whether the State of New Mexico could impose a severance tax on oil and
gas produced by a non-Indian corporation whose income was generated
from land it was leasing from the Tribe within the Mescalero Apache Indian
Reservation.197 The Court held that the state tax was not preempted.198
Finding no “backdrop of tribal sovereignty” in this area of the law because
a 1927 statute had allowed state taxation on this reservation, the Court took
the position that there was no presumption in favor of preemption.199 Instead, the Court asked whether subsequent legislation to the 1927 statute
could be construed as preempting such state taxation and found none.200 In
dissent, Justice Blackmun thought that the majority had given up on a true
balancing of the interests, and stated:
Instead of engaging in a careful examination of state, tribal and federal interests . . . the majority has adopted the principle of “the inexorable zero”. . .
[u]nder the majority’s approach, there is no pre-emption unless the States
are entirely excluded from a sphere of activity and provide no services to the
Indians or to the lessees they seek to tax.201

Furthermore, the dissent also noted that in finding that state taxation
here would not impose any economic burden on the Tribe, the Court
blinded itself to the economics of oil and gas production. As stated by the
dissent, “The fact that the [Tribe has] seen fit to impose their own taxes
194. Id. at 175 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005); Wagnon v. Prairie Band
Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005); Arizona Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr., 526 U.S. 32
(1999); Cass Cty. v. Leech Lake Band, 524 U.S. 103 (1998); Montana v. Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. 696
(1998); Department of Taxation v. Milhelm, 512 U.S. 61 (1994); County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
196. 490 U.S. 163 (1988).
197. Id. at 166.
198. Id. at 182–83.
199. Id. at 182–87.
200. Id. at 182–83.
201. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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renders the threat to tribal interests which is always inherent in state taxation all the more apparent . . . it is inevitable that a point will be reached at
which the State’s taxes will impose a ceiling on tribal tax revenues.”202
After Cotton Petroleum, when the facts guiding the Indian preemption
balancing inquiry seemed to disfavor state taxation, the Court found other
ways to allow state taxation. For instance, in Blaze Construction203 the
Court refused to use the Indian preemption doctrine because the non-Indian
contractor in charge of a road improvement project was working pursuant to
a contract with the federal government.204 Why should the fact that a contract is with the federal government matter when it comes to the application
of the Indian preemption doctrine? The Court had only this to say: “The
need to avoid litigation and to ensure efficient tax administration counsels
in favor of a bright-line standard for taxation of federal contracts, regardless
of whether the contracted-for activity takes place on Indian reservations.”205
Another case where the United States Supreme Court refused to use
the balancing of the interest test was Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi
Nation.206 The issue in Wagnon was whether the State of Kansas could
impose an excise tax on fuel sold by a non-Indian distributor to the Prairie
Band of Potawatomi Nation.207 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
had ruled against the state tax using the traditional balancing preemption
test.208 The Court reversed, holding that the state taxing statute meant to tax
the receipt of the fuel by the first distributor and not its subsequent sale to
the Tribe.209 Therefore, the balancing test was not applicable because the
tax incurred by the non-Indian distributor occurred off the reservation.210
In their dissent, Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy noted that, although
the tax was formally imposed on the non-Indian distributor, in reality, the
tax burdened reservation activities.211 According to Justice Ginsburg, the
tax should have been considered as having taken place on the Indian reservation because under the applicable statute, “[t]o whom and where the distributor sells are the criteria that determine the ‘transactions’ on which ‘[n]o
202. Id. at 209–10; see also F. Michael Willis, The Power to Tax Economic Activity in Indian Country, 28-SPG NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 8, 10–11 (2016).
203. Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. Blaze Const. Co., Inc., 526 U.S. 32 (1999).
204. Id. at 37.
205. Id. at 37–38.
206. 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
207. Id. at 99.
208. 379 F.3d 979, 987 (10th Cir. 2004).
209. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 106.
210. The Court revealed its antagonism towards the balancing preemption test when it stated, ”The
application of the interest-balancing test to the Kansas motor fuel tax is not only inconsistent with the
special geographic sovereignty concerns that gave rise to that test, but also with our efforts to establish a
‘bright line standard[s]’ in the context of tax administration.” Id. at 113.
211. Id. at 123–24 (Ginsburg and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
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tax is . . . imposed, and correspondingly the transaction on which the tax is
imposed.”’212 Another instance where the Court showed its blindness to the
economic realities on the ground occurred when Justice Thomas, writing for
the majority, asserted that the Tribe’s “[d]ecision to impose a tax should
have no effect on its net revenues from the operation of the station.”213 As
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Kennedy, noted in dissent, “As a practical matter, however, the two tolls cannot coexist.”214
In City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,215 a case decided the same
year as Wagnon, Justice Ginsburg was not as sympathetic to the Tribe. The
issue there was whether the City could tax property the Oneida Indian Nation had recently bought.216 The Tribe was arguing that the property was
not taxable because it was located within the Tribe’s ancestral treaty reservation.217 The City was arguing that the area where the Tribe had recently
acquired its land was no longer within the exterior border of the reservation.218 The Court, per Justice Ginsburg, upheld the right of the City to tax
tribal property.219 Refusing to answer whether the properties were within
the ancestral tribal treaty reservation, the Court instead grounded its holding
in the three equitable doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility.220
The Court also added some confusing language that allowed lower
courts to greatly expand on an already—to put it kindly—innovative application of the law. First, it fashioned a new principle under which Indian
tribes cannot invoke their sovereign powers if it would be disruptive of the
settled and justifiable expectations of state entities.221 The Court also added
that when “a party belatedly asserts a right to present and future sovereign
control over territory, longstanding observances and settled expectations are
prime considerations . . . [here], it has been two centuries since the Oneidas
212. Id.
213. Id. at 114.
214. Id. at 116 (Ginsburg and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
215. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
216. Id. at 202.
217. Id. at 211.
218. Brief for Petitioner at 15, City of Sherrill, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 2004
WL 1835364 (U.S. Aug. 12, 2004) (No. 03-855).
219. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214.
220. Id. at 221.
221. As stated by the Court,
This Court has observed in the different, but related, context of the diminishment of an Indian
reservation that “[t]he longstanding assumption of jurisdiction by the State over an area that is
over 90% non-Indian, both in population and in land use,” may create “justifiable expectations.” . . . Similar justifiable expectations, grounded in two centuries of New York’s exercise
of regulatory jurisdiction, until recently uncontested by OIN, merit heavy weight here.
Id. at 215–16 (internal citations omitted).
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last exercised regulatory control over the properties here or held them free
from local taxation.”222
Later in the opinion, Justice Ginsburg implicitly acknowledged that the
lack of limiting principles was at play in the Court’s decision. Thus, she
stated, “If OIN may unilaterally reassert sovereign control and remove these
parcels from the local tax rolls, little would prevent the Tribe from initiating
a new generation of litigation to free the parcels from local zoning or other
regulatory controls that protect all landowners in the area.”223
Although Justice Ginsburg asserted that “the question of damages for
the Tribe’s ancient dispossession is not at issue in this case, and we therefore do not disturb our holding in Oneida II,”224 lower courts have interpreted City of Sherrill as preventing any remedies,225 including monetary
damages, that would be disruptive of the long-standing expectations of nonIndians.226 Also forbidden would be any tribal claim premised on the
Oneidas’ assertion of a valid title to their original reservation.227
I am willing to agree that the actions of the Oneida Indian Nation in
City of Sherrill disrupted the settled expectations of the taxing governmental entities. However, if that is the case, a fair level playing field between
the Tribes and the States would call for a prohibition on states, counties,
and towns from disrupting the justifiable and settled expectations of Indian
tribes. Yet none of that was ever mentioned in Alaska v. Native Village of
Venetie228 when, years after the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), the Court held that tribally-owned land was not Indian
country, and therefore, the Tribe had no sovereign power to tax non-members working on those lands.229 The same applies to the situation in
Carcieri v. Salazar,230 where 75 years after enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),231 the Court discovered that tribes not under federal
jurisdiction as of 1934 could not petition the federal government to take
land into trust for them. Not to mention older decisions like Tee-hit-ton
222. Id. at 218.
223. Id. at 220.
224. Id. at 221.
225. See Joseph William Singer, Indian Title: Unravelling the Racial Context of Property Rights, 10
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 43 (2017).
226. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 268 (2d Cir. 2005); see also, Kathryn E. Fort,
The New Laches: Creating Title Where None Existed, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357 (2009).
227. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 135 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. New York, 756 F.3d 163, 165 (2d Cir. 2014) (“It is now well established that
Indian land claims asserted generations after an alleged dispossession are inherently disruptive of state
and local governance and the settled expectations of current landowners, and are subject to dismissal on
the basis of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility.”).
228. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
229. Id. at 532–33.
230. 555 U.S. 379 (2009).
231. Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat 984.
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Indians v. United States,232 which held that Alaskan Native tribes never had
recognized title to lands they thought were theirs since time immemorial.233
And this is just the proverbial tip of the iceberg. One could write a book
about all the United States Supreme Court cases that have upset the settled
and justifiable expectations of Indian tribes throughout history.234
V.

CONCLUSION

The Indian preemption doctrine started out as a means of balancing
conflicting tribal and state interests but was, in the long run, hijacked by
Justices such as Chief Justice Rehnquist, who did not believe in any level
playing field or, for that matter, in tribal sovereignty. What happened to the
Indian preemption doctrine should serve as a cautionary tale in all cases
where the Court attempts to use limiting principles or reach level playing
fields involving other principles of federal Indian law.
Every legal doctrine or principle of law has policy goals behind it.
Sometimes, the Court officially delineates the policies underlying the principle of law or doctrine on which its decisions purportedly rest. Other times,
there are unstated background norms and goals not officially mentioned by
the Court that nevertheless play a crucial role in the decisions. This Article
has argued that when it comes to off-reservation tribal sovereign immunity
and off-reservation treaty rights, the United States Supreme Court has been
looking for limiting principles purporting to establish level playing fields
between tribes and states. Whether a level playing field has been achieved,
however, is in the eyes of the beholder as it involves a subjective judgment.
It is also a goal that may not be truly reachable given the different constitutional status of tribes and states. As the areas of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers and state taxation on Indian reservations have shown, limiting
principles can easily be manipulated against tribal sovereign interests. One
can only hope that the same thing will not happen to the areas of tribal
sovereign immunity and tribal treaty rights.

232. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., Walter Echo-Hawk, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST INDIAN LAW
CASES EVER DECIDED (2018).
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